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Abstract
Game theory has become an important tool in solving real-life decision making problems.
Security games use the concept of game theory in adversarial scenarios to protect critical
infrastructure. The main purpose of security games is to allocate security resources among
various targets and maximize payoff for the defender considering various kinds of attackers. It is hard for domain experts to predict the attacker’s behavior, so one of the major
challenges in describing this game model is representing uncertainty about the attacker’s
payoff. Several approaches have been developed to generate these game models based on
uncertainty, such as Bayesian games. However Bayesian approaches have drawbacks in solution quality and time. The work of this thesis proposes a polynomial time algorithm that
represents uncertainty based on intervals and generates a robust solution for large security
games unlike previous methods. I also present a methodology to transform Bayesian games
with distributional uncertainty into interval games, and use this novel interval algorithm
to generate an approximate solution. At the end of this thesis, empirical data shows that
this novel technique is faster and generates higher quality solution compared to previous
Bayesian approaches.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In every nation, protecting critical infrastructure is one of the main tasks of security personnel. However, compared to the number of targets, the number of security resources
is typically limited. Security organizations must randomize and allocate their limited resources to minimize the risk of a target being attacked. Security games can play a big role
in solving these resource allocation problems. Applications based on security games like
ARMOR, IRIS, and PROTECT [25, 28, 29] have already been deployed in the field and
are expediting resource allocation decisions.
In the process of developing security games models, one of the most challenging tasks is
to define the characteristics of adversaries or attackers. As decision makers are not aware
of the behaviors of the potential attackers, a model need to be developed to represent uncertainty. Previous works on security game models based on uncertainty lead to solution
methods which lacks guarantees on solution quality or are computationally expensive. In
the work of this thesis, a fast polynomial time algorithm is presented for security games
which handles uncertainty efficiently by representing the uncertainty as intervals over possible payoffs. Experiments show that this novel interval technique is competitive compared
to existent solution methods and for large games it performs better.

1.1

Game Theory

In game theory [20], a game is a mathematical model which consists of a set of players, a set
of actions for each player and a set of reward values for each of the outcomes. An outcome
is an action choice for each player. Game theory is the study of game models where there
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Table 1.1: A zero-sum game
c

d

a (1, −1) (3, −3)
b

(0, 0)

(2, −2)

are conflicts or cooperations between intelligent rational decision makers. Game theory
is applied to various fields, explicitly in economics, political science, psychology, biology,
computer science and logic. In game theoretic analysis of a given problem, a game model
is generated for that problem based on data or expert knowledge of the domain, and then
the game is analyzed to determine good action choices or to predict what other players are
likely to do.
Some popular examples of games are The Prisoner’s Dilemma, Battle of Sexes, and
Hawk-Dove games. Table 1.1 contains an example of a zero-sum game where row player
chooses from actions a and b, and the column player chooses from c and d. There are four
outcomes in this game. Each of the outcomes defines reward values for each player for
playing actions. For example, the outcome (a, c) defines that if row player plays action a
and column player plays action c, reward values for them are 1 and −1, respectively. The
main characteristic of a zero-sum game is that for each possible outcome the reward values
for two players sum up to zero.
Strategies of a player can be divided into two categories: pure strategies and mixed
strategies. In the pure strategy game, the player selects one action from the set of actions.
In the mixed strategy game, the player selects an action based on some probability distribution. Playing a mixed strategy has advantages over a pure strategy, which is explained
in more detail in Chapter 3.
Stackelberg games are special type of games which consist of two players, a leader and
a follower. The leader acts first and the follower acts next based on the observation of the
leader’s strategy. The Stackelberg game model is being used as a framework to develop
2

Table 1.2: A non-cooperative non-zero-sum game
c

d

a (2, 1) (4, 0)
b

(1, 0) (3, 1)

many game-theoretic solutions specially in security domains, because it is a natural model
of attacker surveillance and planning capabilities.
Some of the common solution concepts associated with game theory are best response,
Nash Equilibrium, and Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium. The following section describes
briefly these solution concepts which will be used later in this thesis.

1.1.1

Best Response

Best response is a strategy which produces best outcome for a player given the strategy of
the opposite player. In the example of Table 1.2, if the row player plays choice a, the best
response for the column player would be c, as changing the decision does not improve the
column player’s reward value. However, if the row player opts for b, the best response for
the column player would be d for similar reason.
Now suppose that the row player opts for a mixed strategy, and instead of choosing
a or b, he chooses each of them 50% of the time. If the attacker plays c observing the
defender’s actions, he receives a payoff of 0.5 (1 · 0.5 + 0 · 0.5) and by playing d he receives
1 (0 · 0.5 + 2 · 0.5). In this scenario, the attacker’s best repose will be playing choice d.

1.1.2

Nash Equilibrium

The concept of Nash equilibrium was first proposed by the famous mathematician John
Forbes Nash Jr. [20]. It is a solution concept where players move simultaneously and
each of the opposite players plays their best responses knowing the actions of other player
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and they do not benefit by changing their own actions. Table 1.2 shows an example of a
non-cooperative game where the row and the column players play against each other.
In this game, if the row player plays a and the column player plays c, none of them
can benefit by changing their respective choices. The only Nash-Equilibrium outcome in
this game is when row player plays a and column player plays c. On the other hand, the
outcome (b, d), where the row player and the column player plays b and d respectively, is
not considered as an Nash-Equilibrium outcome as the row player has a reward of 3, but
can benefit by playing a, where he would have a reward value of 4.

1.1.3

Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium

Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is a solution concept for Stackelberg games where
the leader plays a mixed strategy and the follower observes the mixed strategy and chooses
a best response. For example suppose that in the game of Table 1.2, the row player plays
a 50% of time and b 50% of time. The best response for the column player is d, which
gives the row player an expected utility of 3.5 and the column player gets 0.5. To find
the SSE, all the possible mixed strategies must be searched for the leader to find the one
that gives the maximum value. In this solution concept, it is assumed that the follower
breaks tie in favor of the leader, which means if the follower’s chosen strategy returns him
reward values similar to the leader’s, follower will play a different choice where the leader
gets better reward value.

1.2

Security Games

Security games are a branch of game theory where adversarial entities try to maximize
their own payoffs or reward values by playing against the other player. In particular,
security games model problems in allocating security resources efficiently against motivated
attackers who can learn security strategies. In this field, one of the biggest challenges is
creating game models based on unreliable data or conflicting expert opinions. As most of
4

Table 1.3: A security game with 4 targets

Defender’s Reward for Covered Target

t1

t2

t3

t4

1

0

2

3
10

Defender’s Penalty for Uncovered Target

−1

−4 −6

Attackers’s Penalty for Covered Target

−2

−3 −3 −2

Attackers’s Reward for Uncovered Target

1

3

4

5

these game models have some associated uncertainty, it is hard to find a robust solution
for these games.
Table 1.3 contains a simple example of a security game where each column represents
possible targets, where a target can be a critical infrastructure (e.g., terminals in airport).
In any security game scenario, there are limited number of defenders (usually less than the
number of targets). In the example of Table 1.3 there is only one defender. When the
defender protects target t1 , the target t1 is covered. For each target there is a reward and
penalty value for that target for both players for the cases when the target is either covered
or uncovered at the time of attack.
As this game is modeled as a Stackelberg game, the attacker can observe the randomized strategies of the defender. When t1 is covered, if the attacker chooses to attack t1 , the
attacker gets a penalty or lower payoff, but if target t1 is uncovered, he receives a higher
reward value. The task for the defender is to find the optimal randomized strategy, assuming that the attacker will respond optimally. This corresponds to calculating the Strong
Stackelberg Equilibrium (SBE) of the game.
Security games are being used as a general framework for modeling a wide variety of
resources allocation decisions in adversarial security domains. In decision making, Stackelberg games have become an important modeling paradigm which is more analogous to a
real-life security scenarios where attackers can observe the strategies of the defender and
can act accordingly. The technique of Stackelberg games are also being used in security
5

domains such as critical infrastructure protection [5, 27], computer networks [3, 22], and
robot patrolling strategies [2, 4, 9].

1.3

Security Games with Uncertainty

Due to unpredictability of human attackers security games must be modeled based on
uncertainty. Bayesian games are [11] the most common framework for reasoning about
uncertainty in game theory. In this formalism, information about the characteristics of one
player or more is incomplete. A Bayesian game models uncertainty by introducing “Nature”
as a player in a game. Nature introduces uncertainty by taking random moves that can not
be observed fully by the other players, analogous to a dealer in Poker choosing the cards
in each player’s hand randomly. The existing approaches to solve security games with
uncertainty are based on Bayesian Stackleberg game formulations that model uncertainty
about payoffs, the observation capabilities of an attacker and other factors [12, 16, 23, 24,
31]. All of these current solution methods have problems with solution quality and solution
time. Finite Bayesian Stackelberg games where there are finite number of attacker types
are NP-hard to solve [8], and infinite Bayesian Stackelberg game does not have an exact
algorithm [16], and lacks guarantees in solution quality.
The existing model of Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games uses distributions (e.g., Gaussian distribution or uniform distribution) to define uncertainty. This thesis uses intervals
to represent possible payoff uncertainty. It takes a worst-case optimization approach which
tries to maximize the defender’s worst case payoff with respect to uncertainty. In this
model, the defender only knows that the attacker’s payoff for a target falls within some
interval of possible values and tries to maximize the worst case payoff with respect to these
intervals.
Interval-based approach has advantages over the Bayesian approach for modeling uncertainty in both solution quality and time. It is much easier for a domain expert to generate
an interval game model compared to Bayesian model, because this does not require de-
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tailed informations about the probability distribution of payoffs for possible targets. While
existing Bayesian models are NP-hard, a polynomial-time approximation algorithm is introduced that is scalable and provides tight bounds on solution quality for the model with
interval uncertainty. For large security games, this algorithm based on interval uncertainty
may be the only computationally feasible approach to handle uncertainty.

1.4

Contributions

My primary contributions in the work of this thesis are as follows:
1. Definition of the new model of Interval Security Game (ISG).
2. Analysis of the model, leading to the implementation of a polynomial-time algorithm
for finding solutions to ISG.
3. A methodology for approximating Distributional Security Games (DSG) by transforming distributional uncertainty to intervals.
4. Experiments to evaluate the efficiency of the new algorithm and the solution quality, including comparisons with the best known methods for DSG showing that my
transformation methods yields high quality approximate solutions.
5. A new methodology for defining and experimenting on incorrectly specified game
models, and experiments further showing the robustness of the interval model in
cases of incorrect modeling assumptions by the defender.

1.5

Thesis Outline

Chapter 2 describes related works on the basic ideas based on which this thesis was formed.
These include security games, modeling uncertainty, worst case approaches, works on interval and applications of security games deployed in various fields. Chapter 3 starts
7

with a formal definition of security games and extends this to Interval Security Games.
Chapter 4 presented the ISG algorithm and all the ideas and formulations for this new
approach. Chapter 5 describes the main concept used in distributional security games and
then describes how these games can be transformed into ISG. Chapter 6 presents all the
experimental analysis conducted to evaluate the solution quality and runtime of the new
model and algorithm. Chapter 7 concludes the thesis with a summary of the work done
and topics for possible future work.
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Chapter 2
Related Work
In this chapter I briefly describe some game solving approaches in security games, their
backgrounds and applications in the real world.

2.1

Game Theory Applied to Security

Nations and organizations need to protect locations of military, economic and political
importance from groups or individuals that can cause harm. Due to the fact that there are
limited number of security resources, full coverage of important locations is not possible.
Security game are being used to create optimal patrolling strategies to protect targets from
attackers. There are several applications deployed at various locations for security that are
described in this section.
The Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes (ARMOR) system is deployed at
Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) since 2007 to schedule canine patrol and vehicle
checkpoints at airport [25]. Figure 2.1(a) is one of the LAX checkpoints scheduled by the
ARMOR system. ARMOR models patrolling or monitoring problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, allowing the agent to appropriately weigh the different actions in randomization,
as well as uncertainty over adversary type. ARMOR combines three key features: (i) It
uses DOBSS, which uses mixed strategies to enable randomization; (ii) The mixed-initiative
interface allows users to adjust or override the automated schedule based on their local constraints; (iii) It alerts the users if mixed-initiative overrides appear to degrade the overall
desired randomization.
Intelligent Randomization In Scheduling (IRIS) was developed to schedule FAMS (Fed-
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eral Air Marshal Service) on flights [29]. The game models which this system is based
on are very large as there are tens of thousands of flight everyday and thousands of air
marshals with complex scheduling constraints. IRIS is modeled as Stackelberg game, with
FAMs (Federal Air Marshal) as leaders that commit to a flight coverage schedule and terrorists as followers that attempt to attack a flight. IRIS is currently deployed as part of
the international scheduling practices of FAMS.
Game-theoretic Unpredictable and Randomly Deployed Security (GUARDS) uses a
game theoretic approach for national scale security deployment for airport security [26].
The scheduling assistant has been delivered to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and is currently under evaluation and testing for scheduling practices at an
undisclosed airport. Previous applications like ARMOR and IRIS were focused on one-off
tailored applications and one security activity (e.g., canine patrol or checkpoints) per application. GUARDS focuses on reasoning about hundreds of heterogeneous security activities
and diverse potential threats.
Port Resilience Operational/Tactical Enforcement to Combat Terrorism (PROTECT)
is a game-theoretic system deployed by the United States Coast Guard (USCG) in the
ports of Boston, Los Angeles and New York for scheduling their patrols [28]. PROTECT
is modeled based on attacker-defender Stackelberg game model and avoids the assumption
of perfect adversary rationality like previous works and relies on a Quantal Response (QR)
model of the adversary’s behavior.
Game theory is also used for applications in cybersecurity [3, 22]. Using game-theoretic
concepts, a generic model has been developed for distributed Intrusion Detective Systems
(IDS) with network sensors [3]. In this work, two platform-independent game-theoretic
schemes have been proposed which addresses basic security trade-offs. To protect network
from possible attackers, there have been game-theoretic investigations of the effects of
deception on the interactions between attacker and defender of a computer network [7]. This
is an incomplete-information non-cooperative signaling game where defender can employ
camouflage by either disguising a normal system as a honeypot, or by disguising a honeypot
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as a normal system.
There are also applications of game theory for patrolling strategies for robots and unmanned vehicles and for network security [3, 22, 30]. Much of these papers are computational in nature, and progress on security games has been driven by many algorithms that
made solutions more robust and applicable to real-life scenarios.

(a) A vehicle checkpoint at LAX

(b) IRIS scheduling system

Figure 2.1: Applications of security games

2.2

Modeling uncertainty in security games

Game theory is becoming a vital framework for reasoning about real world security problems including critical infrastructure protection. The game models for these applications
are based on expert analysis and historical data which includes activities and possible characteristics of terrorists. So it is quite natural to represent uncertainty over these parameters.
One of the major challenges in developing security game model is handling uncertainty. To
model uncertainty in games, the Bayesian game model was proposed by John Harsanyi [11],
which defines nature as one of the players in the game. Harsanyi developed a theory for the
11

analysis of games with incomplete informations, where players are uncertain about some
important parameters of the game situation such as the payoff functions, the strategies of
other players, etc.
Bayesian games are also useful to represent uncertainty in security games. Bayesian
Stackelberg games allow us to explicitly model players as types, where each type can have its
own preference. However finding a Stackelberg equilibrium in Bayesian game is NP-hard [8].
There are several works on problems of robustness in security games, most of which adopt
a Bayesian framework for reasoning about uncertainty [12, 16, 23, 24, 31]. Some notable
works on Bayesian games applied to security games are DOBSS [23], HBGS [12], IBGS [16]
and HUNTER [31], which will be described in turn.
Decomposed Optimal Bayesian Stackelberg Solver (DOBSS) analyzes the entire Bayesian
game at once without using the Harsanyi transformation by using a mixed-integer linear
program, which optimizes against each adversary type independently while keeping the
leader strategy fixed across all types. However, this method fails to scale up beyond 10
types even for 20 actions for the players, or beyond 30 actions for just 5 follower types.
Hierarchical Bayesian solver for General Stackelberg games (HBGS) is a much faster
algorithm for finite Bayesian Stackelberg games. This algorithm was used in the original
ARMOR application at the LAX airport. This technique is based on heirarchical decomposition and branch and bound search over the follower type space. But it is still too slow
to scale to domains such as FAMS (Federal Air Marshals Service) with thousands of actions and restricting the model to small number of attacker types can lead to poor solution
quality.
Handling UNcerTainty Efficiently using Relaxation (HUNTER) provides an unified approach to handle uncertainty not over only discrete follower types but also other continuously distributed real world uncertainty including the leader’s execution error, the follower’s
observation error and continuous payoff uncertainty. HUNTER continues the trend of speed
improvements and is even faster than HBGS, and is currently the fastest known algorithm
for finite Bayesian Stackelberg games. The main advantage of HUNTER is that it handles
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both type of uncertainty simultaneously by scaling up Bayesian Stackelberg games and it
performs better than other competing algorithms.
Infinite Bayesian Stackelberg games (IBGS) is able to solve large game models with
infinite number of attacker types and payoff uncertainty which are represented by distributions [16]. DOBSS and HBGS are used to solve games with finite number of attacker types.
However, restricting models to a small number of attacker types leads to poor solution quality. To solve incomplete information games there are several approximate methods, among
which Greedy Monte Carlo (GMC) has the best performance in solution quality and scalability. It uses a greedy heuristics for allocating defender resources with very fast method
for updating the attacker response function estimated using Monte Carlo Sampling.
There are also other specifics examples of infinite Bayesian games that have been solved
analytically, including many types of auctions [19]. However there are few works for solving
large and infinite Bayesian games like IBGS. Monte Carlo Sampling approaches similar to
those used in IBGS have been applied to some kind of auctions [6]. In addition, the
literature on stochastic choice [20, 21] studies problems that are simplified versions of the
choice problem attackers face in our model.

2.3

Worst-Case Approaches to Robustness

An alternative to Bayesian games that has been developed recently is robust equilibrium [1],
which proposes a distribution free model and takes a worst-case approach inspired by robust optimization literature for incomplete information games. Robust optimization is a
modeling methodology, combined with other computational tools, to process optimization
problem in which data are uncertain. For robustness against human decision-makers [24],
the most closely related model for security games is BRASS (Bounded Rationality Assumption in Stackelberg Solver), which was introduced by Pita et al [26]. This model assumes
that the follower is boundedly rational and may not be able to maximize utility strictly.
The follower selects one response from multiple optimal responses and the robust approach
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is to assume that the follower could choose the response that provides the leader the worst
reward value.
Current algorithms for Stackelberg games are based on two fundamental assumptions.
The first assumption is that the followers act rationally to maximize the utility, and the
second, if the follower faces a tie in its strategies’ rewards, it will break tie in favor of the
leader, choosing a strategy that gives higher rewards to the leader. However, leader may
face followers who fail to response optimally in real world domains. This may be caused
by follower’s bounded rationality or uncertainty regarding leader’s strategy, and there is no
prior probability distributions available for this follower response uncertainty.
To overcome this situation, decision makers optimize against the worst outcome over
the uncertainty [1]. In solution methods like BRASS, leaders make robust decision by
considering that the bounded rational follower could choose a strategy from its range of
responses that degrades the leader’s rewards the most or that he could choose a strategy
that is based on limited observations. This approach is in contrast with standard robust
optimization methodology in that it makes prediction about how and why the human
adversary’s response will deviate and robustly guards against those predictions as opposed
to considering arbitrary deviations in the responses. BRASS addresses the uncertainty
that may arise from human imprecision in choosing the expected optimal strategy due to
bounded rationality.

2.4

Interval Computation

Interval computing is a board field in which rigorous mathematics is associated with scientific computing. This methods was first developed by mathematicians as an approach
to put bounds on rounding errors and measurement errors in order to produce reliable
results in mathematical computations. Interval arithmetic or computation can be used in
various areas (e.g., set inversion, motion planning), in order to treat estimates for which
no exact numerical values can be stated [13]. Applications based on interval computa-
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tion are gaining popularity in quality control, economics, computer graphics and computer
aided design, quantum mechanics as well as other fundamental ideas [14]. Some C++ and
Fortan compiler support interval arithmetic directly by handling interval data types and
suitable operation such as language extension. Many software packages allow development
of numerical analysis using interval arithmetic [18].
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Chapter 3
Security Games
In this chapter the ideas behind security games and interval security games are described.

3.1

Formal Definition of Security Games

In this section the basic security game model is introduced first and then this model is
extended to include interval uncertainty about the attacker’s payoffs. A security game
consists of two players, a defender Θ and an attacker Ψ. The defender is protecting a set
of targets T = {t1 , . . . , tn } (e.g., airport terminals or computer servers) from attacks using
a limited number of resources, with the number of available resources denoted by m. It is
assumed that all resources are identical and can be used to protect any target. The set of
pure strategies for the attacker, denoted by ΣΨ , correspond to actions of attacking exactly
one target from T . Each pure strategy for the defender corresponds to a subset of targets
from T with size less than or equal to m.
In the model there are two kinds of payoff values: values for covered targets and values
for uncovered targets. Table 3.2 contains necessary notations and their meanings. An attack
on a covered target is “unsuccessful” and an attack on an uncovered target is “successful”.
In a security game it is also assumed that UΘc (t) ≥ UΘu (t) and UΨu (t) ≥ UΨc (t) for all t ∈ T
where UΘc (t) and UΘu (t) denote defender’s covered and uncovered payoffs and UΨc (t) and
UΨu (t) denote attaker’s covered and uncovered payoffs respectively. This is analogous to a
real-world security scenario. Whenever a target is uncovered and if there is an attack on
that target, the attacker gets higher payoff and defender gets a lower or negative payoff. On
the other hand if the target is covered and there is an attack, defender gets higher payoff
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Table 3.1: A sample game
c

d

a (2, 1) (4, 0)
b

(1, 0) (3, 2)

and the attacker gets a lower one.
The interaction between the attacker and the defender is modeled as a Stackelberg game.
The main idea behind the Stackelberg game is that the follower can observe strategies of
the leader and act accordingly. In a security game scenario, the attacker (or follower)
observes the defender’s (or leader’s) strategy and then takes action. The attacker plays
a pure strategy while the defender plays a mixed strategy. The next paragraph describes
why playing a mixed strategy will give the defender a better payoff. Since the attacker sees
the defender’s strategy, there always exists a pure strategy best response, so the attacker
does not need a mixed strategy.
In the game in Table 3.1, the defender is a row player and the attacker is a column
player. The defender has a choice of playing a or b and the attacker has a choice of playing
c or d. Each of the squares defines a possible outcome which contains each player’s payoffs
for that outcome. For example if the defender plays a and the attacker plays c, the defender
will have a payoff of 2 and the attacker will have a payoff of 1.
If the defender opts for a pure strategy, he chooses a, as it ensures that minimum and
maximum defender’s payoff is greater than the other choice b. The attacker will choose
c based on the defender’s decision a. In the end the defender has a payoff of 2. Now,
suppose the defender opts for a mixed strategy such that instead of choosing a or b, he can
choose each of them 50% of the time. In that case the attacker will choose his best response
based on the defender’s action. If the attacker plays c observing the defender’s actions, he
receives a payoff of 0.5(1 · 0.5 + 0 · 0.5) and by playing d he receives 1 (0 · 0.5 + 2 · 0.5).
As the attacker gets higher payoff by playing d, he will choose action d and the defender
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will receive a payoff of 3.5 (0.5 · 4 + 0.5 · 3 = 3.5). On the other hand, if the defender plays
a pure strategy, he receives a payoff of 2. So by playing a mixed strategy the defender
receives a better reward value. So the defender first commits to a mixed strategy δΘ that is
a probability distribution over the pure strategies from ΣΘ . The attacker then observes this
mixed strategy δΘ , and chooses a best response strategy from ΣΨ that gives the attacker
the maximum possible payoff.
The defender’s mixed strategies are represented as coverage vectors which gives the
probability that there is a defender resource assigned to each target. These probabilities
for each target ti are denoted by ci , with

n
P

ci = m, and the full vector of probabilities is

i=1

denoted by C. These are the targets that the defender chooses to protect.

3.2

Interval Security Games

One of the hardest parts of solving security game problems is generating the game models
which can be done based on historical data, intelligence, and opinions from expert analysts.
However, precise estimation of these parameters is difficult in practice. There are two
general approaches to generate these game models: Bayesian game models and Interval
game models. Both of these game models use uncertainty on payoff functions. Bayesian
game models use distributions over payoff functions.
The game model presented in this thesis is named Interval Security Game model, which
extends the model of standard security game. In this model the defender has uncertainty
about the attacker’s payoffs in the form of intervals, and both the defenders and the attackers know their own payoffs. As the attacker can directly observe the defender’s strategies,
the attacker does not need to predict defender’s strategy. This model replaces the attacker’s covered and uncovered payoffs with ranges of payoffs as seen in Table 3.3. The
defender only knows that the attacker’s payoffs are in these ranges, and must predict the
attacker response based on this. The solution methods used previously, including Bayesian
Stackelberg equilibrium, can’t be used in ISG model, as the defender does not know the
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Table 3.2: Notations used in security games

T = {t1 , . . . , tn }

Set of Targets

ti

i-th target i

ci

Coverage for target i

C

Coverage Vector for all targets

m

Total number of resources

Θ

A defender

Ψ

An attacker

UΘu (t)

Defender’s payoff for attack on uncovered target

UΘc (t)

Defender’s payoff for attack on covered target

UΨu (t)

Attacker’s payoff for attack on uncovered target

UΨc (t)

Attacker’s payoff for attack on covered target

R

Maximum of the minimum expected payoff for attackers among all targets

Λ(C)

Potential attack set

δΘ

Set of defender’s mixed strategies

ΣΨ

Set of attacker’s pure strategies
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Table 3.3: Notations of payoffs used in Interval Security Game models
UΨu,min (t)

Attacker’s minimum payoff for attacking an uncovered target t

UΨu,max (t)

Attacker’s maximum payoff for attacking an uncovered target t

UΨc,min (t)

Attacker’s minimum payoff for attacking a covered target t

UΨc,max (t)

Attacker’s maximum payoff for attacking a covered target t

UΘu (t)

Defender’s payoff for attack on uncovered target

UΘc (t)

Defender’s payoff for attack on covered target

v max (ti )

Attacker’s maximum expected payoff for target i

v min (ti )

Attacker’s minimum expected payoff for target i

di

Defender’s expected payoff for target i

distributions of the attacker’s payoff, but only the intervals. Instead the literature of robust
optimization is followed and the defender’s goal in this framework is to find a coverage vector, C, that maximizes the defender’s worst-case payoff over all of the possible ways that
the attacker payoffs could be chosen from the intervals.
Previously defined models use two parameters to represent the attacker’s payoff, as
seen in Table 3.2. For each target t, UΨu (t) and UΨc (t) are used to represent the attacker’s
uncovered and covered payoff respectively for that target. In the new model, each of the
targets has a maximum and minimum payoff for the attacker’s covered and uncovered
payoffs, represented by these four notations, UΨu,max (t) and UΨu,min (t) for the uncovered case,
and UΨc,max (t) and UΨc,min (t) for the covered case.
As the model contains the attacker’s minimum and maximum payoff for each of the
targets, the attacker’s maximum and minimum expected payoff for each of the target can
be calculated given ci , which is the coverage probability for that target.
v max (ti ) = ci · UΨc,max (ti ) + (1 − ci ) · UΨu,max (ti )

(3.1)

v min (ti ) = ci · UΨc,min (ti ) + (1 − ci ) · UΨu,min (ti ).

(3.2)
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The defender’s expected payoff for each target is:
di = ci · UΘc (ti ) + (1 − ci ) · UΘu (ti ).

(3.3)

For a given coverage vector C, the attacker can guarantee a payoff of at least the maximum of the minimum values over all targets; let us denote this value by R = max v min (ti ).
ti

Given the value of R, the targets that could be attacked for some realization of the payoff
values can be identified. Any target ti with a maximum expected value v max (ti ) ≥ R could
be the best target for the attacker to attack. To see this, suppose that the the attacker’s
payoff for ti is the maximum value in the interval, and the payoffs for all other targets is
are the minimal values, so that the best possible value for attacking any target other than
ti is R. Therefore, the potential attack set Λ(C) is defined as:
Λ(C) = {ti : v max (ti ) ≥ R}

(3.4)

The defender’s objective is to find out a strategy C to maximize the worst-case payoff
over all of the targets in the potential attack set:
!

max
C

min di

ti ∈Λ(C)

(3.5)

In the above equation: min di defines the target which is in potential attack set and has
ti ∈Λ(C)

minimum expected payoff for defender. This term is described as worst-case payoff. In this
algorithm the objective is to find out a coverage vector which will maximize this worst case
payoff.
This problem cannot be solved efficiently using linear programming because the set of
targets ti ∈ Λ(C) depends on C. This can be solved using a mixed-integer program (MIP)
which is a slightly generalized version of the MIP used for BRASS ??, which runs slowly
on general problems. Therefore a faster method was developed to solve this problem.
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Chapter 4
Interval Security Games Algorithm
In this chapter, the basic idea behind the interval security game algorithm is explained first
and then the next section presents how the algorithm is formulated.

4.1

Idea Behind ISG

The main idea for finding a coverage strategy with the desired properties is to transform
the optimization problem into a series of feasibility problems. As the number of defenders
(m) is increased, a better coverage vector can be achieved which will lead to better expected
payoffs for the defender. This observation is used to formulate the problem as a binary
search in the space of defender expected payoffs. In each iteration, it is checked whether
the defender payoff at the midpoint of the search space is feasible or not, given that there
are limited number of defenders. If it is not, the left half of the search space is checked.
Otherwise, a similar check is done on the right half of the search space.
In the binary search approach, the problem is analyzed to determine whether a given
defender payoff, which is denoted by D∗ , is feasible or not given the resources available, m.
Since worst-case outcomes need to be ensured, it needs to be guaranteed that the defender
will achieve at least D∗ for any attacker payoffs in the known intervals. For D∗ to be
guaranteed by a particular coverage strategy C, one of the following conditions must hold.
1. The target is in the potential attack set Λ(C), but the defender’s expected payoff for
attacking the target is greater than D∗
2. The target is not in the potential attack set Λ(C).
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The coverage required on each target can be calculated to satisfy Condition 1 for each
target (if it is in Λ) from the equation for the defender’s payoff. The meanings of the
notations used in this chapter can be found in Chapter 3 on Table 3.2. If a target has the full
coverage (coverage probability of 1), the defender’s expected payoff for that target will be
UΘc (t). On the other hand, if a target does not have the full coverage, the defender’s expected
payoff for that target can be calcuated by multiplying UΘc (t) with coverage probability, and
multiplying UΘu (t) with the probability of the target being uncovered and summing them
up. If the defender wants to maintain at least D∗ for target ti with coverage c1i , the following
equation must hold.
D∗ = c1i · UΘc (ti ) + (1 − c1i ) · UΘu (ti )
⇒

D∗ = c1i · UΘc (ti ) + UΘu (ti ) − c1i · UΘu (ti )

⇒

D∗ = c1i · (UΘc (ti ) − UΘu (ti )) + UΘu (ti )

⇒

c1i · (UΘc (ti ) − UΘu (ti )) = D∗ − UΘu (ti )
!
D∗ − UΘu (ti )
1
ci = max 0, c
.
UΘ (ti ) − UΘu (ti )

⇒

(4.1)

This equation makes sure that if coverage c1i is maintained, it will guarantee payoff D∗ . It
is also noticeable that the term c1i is dependent on D∗ − UΘu (ti ). Let’s assume that we want
to make sure a target will guarantee a defender’s payoff of 40. It has covered and uncovered
defender’s payoff 80 and 30 respectively. So the right term of above equation gives us the
value ((40 − 30)/(80 − 30)) = 0.2. If a target has coverage probability of at least 0.2, the
defender’s expected payoff for that target is 40 or greater.
For a given value of R, the minimum coverage can be calculated that would be required
on each target ti so that the target is not in Λ, which requires that the maximum possible
expected payoff for attacking target ti is less than R. The attacker’s expected payoff for
attacking a target can be calculated using the attacker’s covered and uncovered payoff for
attacking that target and the coverage probability. As the target is to find out the minimum
coverage required for a target not to be in the attack set, the attacker’s maximum payoff
for that target will be used. The minimum coverage c2i is calculated as follows, using the
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maximum attacker payoffs from the possible intervals:
R = c2i · UΨc,max (ti ) + (1 − c2i ) · UΨu,max (ti )
⇒

R = c2i · UΨc,max (ti ) + UΨu,max (ti ) − c2i · UΨu,max (ti )

⇒

R = c2i · (UΨc,max (ti ) − UΨu,max (ti )) + UΨu,max (ti )

⇒

c2i · (UΨc,max (ti ) − UΨu,max (ti )) = R − UΨu,max (ti )
!
R − UΨu,max (ti )
2
.
ci = max 0, c,max
UΨ
(ti ) − UΨu,max (ti )

⇒

(4.2)

By summing values of c1i for targets in Λ and c2i for the remaining targets, the minimum
coverage can be found which is required to guarantee D∗ for this potential attack set. A
possible brute force approach of finding c1i and c2i can be applied. But, the number of such
sets is exponential in the number of targets, so this direct approach is highly inefficient.
To avoid this problem, another observation is made that allows to more efficiently explore
candidate solutions. For every possible set Λ there must be some target, which is labeled
as t̂ that has the maximum minimum expected payoff, R. This is the target that defines
the value of R. Since there are only n targets, each target can be tested as a candidate
for t̂, and construct a coverage vector that meets the necessary constraints using minimal
resources under this assumption. If the solution is feasible for any one of the n targets that
are candidates for t̂, then the value of D∗ is feasible. By taking the minimum of c1i and c2i
to calculate the coverage vector, it is made sure that minimum coverage is being used to
guarantee D∗ or to confirm that that target is not in the attack set.
There is one final condition that must be met for each target for the initial assumption
to hold. It must be the case that the target assumed to be t̂ actually has the maximum
minimum expected payoff. This means that all targets other than t̂ must have a minimum attacker payoff which is less than the value of R. This is guaranteed by adding one
additional constraint on the coverage probability assigned to each of the targets. This constraint states that the minimum attacker payoff for the target is less than the calculated
value of R.
R = c3i · UΨc,min (ti ) + (1 − c3i ) · UΨu,min (ti )
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⇒

R = c3i · UΨc,min (ti ) + UΨu,min (ti ) − c3i · UΨu,min (ti )

⇒

R = c3i · (UΨc,min (ti ) − UΨu,min (ti )) + UΨu,min (ti )

⇒

c3i · (UΨc,min (ti ) − UΨu,min (ti )) = R − UΨu,min (ti )
!
R − UΨu,min (ti )
3
ci = max 0, c,min
UΨ (ti ) − UΨu,min (ti )
!
UΨu,min (ti ) − R
3
ci = max 0, u,min
.
UΨ (ti ) − UΨc,min (ti )

⇒
⇒

(4.3)

The value of c3i increases monotonically as R decreases. The final calculation for the
minimum coverage that must be placed on each target is max(c3i , min(c1i , c2i )). These coverages over all the targets are summed up and compared with the available resources m to
determine whether this selection of t̂ yields a feasible solution or not. If this selection does
not yield a feasible solution, the algorithm continues testing the other possible targets as
selections for t̂. As soon as a feasible solution is found, the subroutine terminates and the
binary search continues.

4.2

ISG Algorithm

The ISG algorithm consists of two parts. Algorithm 1 implements binary search in the space
of possible defender payoffs, as described in the previous section. The search continues until
the difference between the maximum and the minimum possible defender’s payoff falls below
, which is the error tolerance parameter for the binary search. By considering a smaller
value of , a better defender’s payoff can be achieved. However, the solution time will be
higher than the one with larger value of .
The feasibility check is presented in Algorithm 2 where the objective is to justify if
the defender’s payoff D∗ is possible or not. If the feasibility check algorithm can generate
a solution where the required resources is less than or equal to m, then D∗ is possible.
The strategy is to divide the search into n possible cases, each of which corresponds to a
different assumption about which of the targets will have the maximum minimum expected
payoff, R. The algorithm iterates through each possible choice of ti as a candidate for this
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Algorithm 1 ISG Solver
for all ti ∈ T do
ci ← 0
end for
maxPayoff ← max UΘc (ti )
ti ∈T

minPayoff ← min UΘu (ti )
ti ∈T

while maxPayoff − minPayoff >  do
midP oint ← (maxPayoff − minPayoff )/2
if feasibilityCheck(midP oint, m, C) then
minPayoff ← M idP oint
else
maxPayoff ← M idP oint
end if
end while
return C
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special target t̂, which was defined earlier. For each of these cases the algorithm constructs
a coverage vector using minimal coverage probability that guarantees the defender’s payoff
D∗ , based on conditions 1 and 2 stated above. Once t̂ is selected, the value of c1t̂ is calculated
which is necessary to ensure D∗ and used to calculate the value of R. Using that R, c2i for
all other targets are found out. Finally another constraint is evaluated which ensures that
t̂ has a minimum expected payoff which is maximum among all the minimum expected
payoffs of all targets.
The worst-case complexity of the algorithm is O(n2 · log(1/)). Each feasibility check
requires one iteration to test each target as t̂, and each iteration does several constant-time
operations on each target to determine the minimal coverage. Therefore, the feasibility
check has complexity O(n2 ). Binary search requires O(log(1/)) iterations to converge
within , giving the overall complexity of O(n2 · log(1/)).
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Algorithm 2 feasibilityCheck
for all ti ∈ T do
c1i ← max(0, 1 −

u (t )
midP oint−UΘ
i
)
c
u
UΘ (ti )−UΘ (ti )

end for
for all ti ∈ T do
totalCov ← c1i
ci ← c1i
if ci > 1 then
GOT O next ti
end if
R ← (c1i · UΨc,min (ti )) + ((1 − c1i ) · UΨu,min (ti )) − 0
for all tj ∈ {T \ti } do
c2j



← max 0, 1 −

c3j ← max(0, 1 −

u,max
R−UΨ
(tj )
c,max
u,max
UΨ
(tj )−UΨ
(tj )

u,min
R−UΨ
(tj )
c,min
u,min
UΨ
(tj )−UΨ
(tj )



)

minCov ← max(c3i , min(c1i , c2i ))
if minCov < 0 or minCov > 1 then
GOT O next ti
end if
totalCov ← totalCov + minCov
cj ← minCov
end for
if totalCov ≤ m then
return TRUE, C
end if
end for
return FALSE
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Chapter 5
Security Games with Distributional
Uncertainty
As described previously, one of the major challenges in solving security games is generating
the game model, and there are two ways of doing it, one with the interval uncertainty
and another with the distributional uncertainty. In this chapter, I describe briefly the
formulation of distributional uncertainty and how it was used in previous solution methods.
I also show the techniques of transforming the distributional game into interval game.

5.1

Distributional Game Model

In the distributional game model, distributions are used instead of intervals to represent
uncertainty. The distributional security games (DSG) model introduced by Kiekintveld
et al [15] uses this approach and presents various approximation algorithm for computing
solutions to the resulting infinite Bayesian Stackleberg games. DSG model contains more
information as it has access to distributional information, but there are two significant
drawbacks.
1. The models are more problematic to define by modeler.
2. These distributional models are computationally challenging and no exact algorithms
are known to compute the exact optimal solution [16].
Compared to distributional security games, interval game models are easy to generate
and use. However, in this thesis, I present a technique to convert that distributional
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game model to interval game model. After the conversion, the interval algorithm is used
to solve the converted model. In the experimental evaluation section I compared this
approximations with the Greedy Monte Carlo (GMC) method which operates directly on
a distributional game.
In distributional security games payoffs are represented as continuous probability density functions (e.g., uniform or Gaussian distributions). The game becomes an infinite
Bayesian Stackleberg game with infinite number of attacker types. The following is the
sequence of interactions:
1. The defender commits to a mixed strategy.
2. Nature chooses a random attacker type by drawing each payoff from the payoff distribution given in the model for that payoff.
3. The attacker observes the defender’s mixed strategy.
4. The attacker plays the best-response that gives attacker the highest expected payoff,
given the specific payoffs drawn by nature.
As seen in Figure 5.1, each of the target has different distributions for the attacker’s
payoff, based on that target being covered or uncovered by the defender. The defender
knows only these distributions, but the attacker knows the specific payoffs drawn by nature.
Attacker response function needs to be calculated first which returns the probabilities that
each target will be attacked, given the distribution of the attacker’s payoffs and coverage
vector C.
Monte Carlo simulation can be used to estimate the attack probabilities on each target.
In DSG, we generate one sample attacker payoff from payoff the distribution for each target
and these payoff values are assigned to a sample attacker type. Using those payoff values we
calculate the best-response for this attacker type against the coverage strategy C. Sampling
a large number of types in this way is used to estimate the expected value of a coverage
strategy for a DSG.
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of attacker payoff
Greedy Monte Carlo (GMC), which is the best known method for solving distributional
games [16], adopts a greedy heuristic for resource allocation and Monte Carlo sampling is
used for updating the attacker’s response function. The idea of this greedy heuristic is that
initially all targets have 0 coverage probability assigned to the target. At each iteration, this
method evaluates the prospect of adding some small increment (∆) of coverage probability
to each target. The algorithm computes the difference between the defender’s expected
payoff for the current coverage vector C and the new coverage vector that differs only in
the coverage for a single target t such that c0t = ct + ∆. The target with the maximum
payoff gain for the defender is selected, ∆ is added to the coverage for that target, and the
algorithm proceeds to the next iteration. It terminates when all of the available resources
have been allocated.
To apply our novel interval algorithm to distributional security games we need to transform the distributional payoffs to interval payoffs. We used a simple method that centers
the interval around the mean of the distribution and determines the size of the interval
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Figure 5.2: Interval payoff for a Gaussian distribution.
based on the standard deviation (σ) of the distribution and a multiplier, m. The multiplier
is a parameter of the algorithm and allows us to have intervals that include a larger or
smaller fraction of the possible payoff values in the distribution by adding or subtracting
from the mean (µ) of the distribution. After applying this method we have the following
two equations. Figure 5.2 explains this transformation. µ1 and µ2 represents “mean” for
attacker’s uncovered and covered payoff distribution respectively.
UΨu,min (t) = µ1 − (σ · m)

(5.1)

UΨu,max (t) = µ1 + (σ · m)

(5.2)

UΨc,min (t) = µ2 − (σ · m)

(5.3)

UΨc,max (t) = µ2 + (σ · m)

(5.4)

Figure 5.3: Linear Interpolation to find the value of multiplier m.
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Additional experiments were performed to find out the value of the multiplier. For this
purpose, two additional parameters were used, which are modifiers and ranges. Using the
values of ranges and modifiers, the upper limits and the lower limits of the multipliers were
calculated. As seen in the Figure 5.3, the x-axis contains minimum and maximum average
attacker payoff and the y-axis contains the limits of the multipliers. For each of the targets,
a different multiplier was calculated using the linear interpolation. Then the attacker’s
interval payoff for each target was calculated using the multiplier and the equations stated
above. However, this set of experiments did not show substantial improvement over the
basic version.
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Chapter 6
Experimental Evaluation
Interval Security Games introduce a novel approach to represent uncertainty in security
games. Experiments done on this algorithm show an improvement in the quality of solutions
and solution time. I ran experiments on randomly generated sample games with various
game parameters. The next two sections present experimental results on run-time and
solution quality of ISG solver algorithm on interval security game, and the performance of
this method to solve distributional security games.

6.1

Experiments on Interval Games

First the speed of ISG solver is tested against an exact Mixed Integer Programming (MIP)
formulation based on BRASS [24]. Table 6.1 shows the game parameters used for this
experiment. Games with various number of targets were generated and it was assumed
that the number of defenders or security personnel is always 20% of the number of targets.

Table 6.1: Parameter settings for the experiments on Figure 1
Parameter

Values

Number of Sample Games

30

Defender Payoff for attack on uncovered target

random between −100 and 0

Attacker Payoff for attack on uncovered target

random between 0 and 100

Payoff for attack on covered target

0 (for both players)

Number of resources

20% of number of targets
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The attacker payoffs were modified to be intervals by using the first value drawn from
distribution of payoffs as the minimum value and and setting the maximum value by adding
a uniform random value between 0 and 20. The tolerance settings control the accuracy of
binary search. A higher tolerance means higher accuracy but takes more time compared
with lower tolerance. Figure 6.1 presents results for the MIP which was solved using GNU
Linear Programming Kit (GLPK version 4.36) [10] and ISG with three tolerance settings.
Even with higher tolerance, ISG is much faster. Figure 6.2 shows ISG settings on much
larger game. In this figure, a modest increase is visible in the solution time with increasing
accuracy. Even for 10000 targets and the highest accuracy setting, ISG solves the game in
half the time required by the MIP to solve games with only 300 targets.
Figure 6.3 shows experimental data based on the impact of interval uncertainty on
solution quality under varying assumptions about the attacker strategy. Parameters listed
in Table 6.2 were used for this experiment. The purpose of the experiment is to show how
adding interval uncertainty decreases the best case payoff and improves against the worst
case.

Figure 6.1: Comparison of solution time for ISG and the MIP solved using GLPK.

35

Figure 6.2: Impact of interval uncertainty on solution quality and robustness

Figure 6.3: Runtime and solution quality analysis for ISG.
In Figure 6.3, the baseline case has no uncertainty. Increasing amount of interval uncertainty was added to the attacker’s payoff and the resulting game was solved using the
ISG solver. In this figure, the x-axis contains the interval sizes and the y-axis contains the
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Table 6.2: Parameter settings for the experiments on Figure 6.3
Parameter

Values

Number of Sample Games

20

Defender Payoff for attack on uncovered target

random between -20 and -10

Attacker Payoff for attack on uncovered target

random between 10 and 20

Payoff for attack on covered target

0 (for both players)

Number of resources

20% of number of targets

defender’s expected payoff. The four different lines represent four different assumptions
about the attacker. The “Nash” attacker always plays the optimal attacker strategy computed in the case with no uncertainty (in this case, the Stackelberg equilibrium strategy is
the same as the Nash strategy [17]). The “Stackelberg” attacker is able to observe the exact
coverage strategy used in each case, and chooses a best-response, as in a Strong Stackelberg
Equilibrium. The “Worst case” attacker always chooses the worst possible target for the
defender, without regard to the attacker’s own payoffs. Finally, the “Guaranteed” payoff
is the payoff that the ISG method is able to guarantee against any rational attacker with
payoffs that lie within the given intervals.
In Figure 6.3, there is a small decrease in the payoffs for the solutions to the interval
games against the Nash and Stackelberg attackers. This is expected, and can be interpreted
as the price of robustness. The advantage of the ISG method comes in the Guaranteed and
Worst Case payoffs. There is an increasing trend in the worst-case payoffs for ISG, with
the strongest results for very large intervals.

6.2

Experiments on Distributional Games

In this set of experiments, the performance of ISG is compared using the methodology for
transforming distributional security games into approximate versions based on intervals to
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Table 6.3: Parameter settings for the algorithms tested in the first experiment.
Parameter

Values

Number of sample Games 300
ISG Multipliers

0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0

BRASS Epsilons

0.6, 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4, 1.6, 1.8, 2.0

GMC Low

increment 0.05, 1000 types

GMC High

increment 0.01, 10000 types

the best existing methods for DSG, Greedy Monte Carlo (GMC) [16] and BRASS [24]. Experiments were done on the same three classes of distributional games used by Kiekintveld
et al. [16], games with Uniform distributions of payoffs, games with Gaussian distributions
with fixed standard deviation (σ) for every payoff, and games with Gaussian distributions
with varying standard deviations (σ), which we will call Gaussian Variable games. This set
of experimental results evaluates the potential for ISG to be used as a fast approximation
algorithm for distributional security games. Parameters used for this sets of experiments
are described in Table 6.3.
The games are generated by first drawing random rewards and penalties for both players.
All rewards are drawn from U[6;8], which defines a uniform distribution where minimum
and maximum values are 6 and 8 respectively, and penalties are drawn from U[2;4]. Then
distributions of the correct type for the attacker’s payoff were generated, using the values
drawn in the first stage as the mean. In uniform games, the length of the uniform interval
was varied to increase or decrease the uncertainty. For Gaussian games, the standard
deviation was varied, and all payoffs have the same amount of uncertainty. Gaussian
variable games have a different standard deviation for each payoff distribution. These
standard deviations are drawn from U[0;1] in the experiments.
In GMC there are two parameters that control the solution time and quality. These are
the number of sample attacker types and size of the increment used in greedy allocation of
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coverage probability. Solution quality improves with a larger number of types and smaller
increment, but the solution time increases. That’s why parameters were divided for GMC
into “high” and “low” sections as found in Table 6.3.
The BRASS method has a parameter , degree of accuracy, which reflects how far attackers may be from choosing the optimal target. The parameters for ISG are “multipliers”
and tolerance. Multiplier is used to generate the interval game from the DSG which is described in Chapter 5. The tolerance is fixed to 0.0001 in our experiments, since auxiliary
experiments showed that the value of the tolerance has very small effect on the solution
quality.

Figure 6.4: Solution quality results for small games with uniform attacker payoff
distributions

In Figure 6.4, Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6 all the experiments are done on small games
(15 targets and 3 resources). These 3 graphs compare solution quality of various approximation algorithm on three types of distributional games: Uniform, Gaussian and Gaussian
Variable. For the Uniform and Gaussian games the amount of payoff uncertainty was varied on the x-axis by varying the standard deviations of the attacker’s payoff distributions.
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Figure 6.5: Solution quality results for small games with Gaussian attacker payoff
distributions.

Figure 6.6: Solution quality results for small games with Gaussian variable attacker
payoff distributions
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For Gaussian Variable distributional games, a different parameter setting was used. All
games have a different standard deviation for each payoff distribution. These standard
deviations are drawn from uniform distribution U[0;1] in the experiments. In all cases, the
defender’s expected payoff is plotted on the y-axis. This is evaluated after the algorithms
return solutions by using a very large number of Monte-Carlo sample types (100,000) to
give a very accurate estimate of the expected payoff for the proposed coverage solution.
The experiment also includes a final baseline method called “Mean” that solves the game
optimally under the assumption that the mean of the distribution is the exact payoff value
(in other words, it ignores the uncertainty in payoffs and solves it as a standard security
game). The mean baseline performs very poorly in all cases. For uniform games, ISG
has the highest solution quality, followed closely by BRASS. For Gaussian and Gaussian
variable games ISG performs slightly worse than the GMC methods, particularly when
there is a large amount of uncertainty. However, the performance is still very competitive.

Figure 6.7: Solution quality results scaling to larger games for uniform attacker
payoff distributions

Figure 6.7, Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 compare the methods for larger games (with higher
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Figure 6.8: Solution quality results scaling to larger games for Gaussian attacker
payoff distributions.

Figure 6.9: Solution quality results scaling to larger games for Gaussian variable
attacker payoff distributions
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number of targets). The standard deviation for uniform and Gaussian games is fixed at
0.5, while the Gaussian variable games use the same distribution of standard deviations as
before. BRASS is not included in this set of results because it was too slow and required
too much memory to complete for some of the larger problems. The pattern of results
is similar to the smaller games. In uniform games there is a greater separation between
the algorithms, with ISG outperforming GMC. On Gaussian and Gaussian variable games,
GMC has higher solution quality, but the overall difference between GMC and ISG is fairly
small.

Figure 6.10: Parameter optimization for ISG on games with Gaussian distributions.
Parameters can have an major effect on solution quality and time. There is no obvious
way to set the correct value of these parameters. The best value can depend on the size
of the game, the type of uncertainty and the amount of uncertainty. For our ISG method
the best multiplier value is used (multiplier which gave us maximum defender payoff). Figure 6.10 shows an experiment to find best parameters for games with Gaussian uncertainty
for the ISG algorithm. The values of multipliers are placed along the y-axis and the values
of payoff uncertainty are placed along the x-axis. Each line in Figure 6.10 represents the
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maximum payoff for the given number of targets. In general the best multipliers are smaller
for smaller games and games with greater uncertainty. Finding the best parameter for the
experiments is not a big problem in practice. The algorithms are fast enough to test a
few parameter settings and find the best parameter at any time. The same parameter settings can be used among various solving methods. For BRASS and ISG, all the parameter
settings were tested upon and the best one was selected.

Figure 6.11: Solution quality and computation time comparisons
Figure 6.11 compares all the run-time of various solutions on large Gaussian games.
As the size of the game increases, solution times for both BRASS and GMC high rapidly
increases. The solution times for Mean and GMC low increases reasonably with game
sizes. On the other hand, in this set of solution methods ISG is the fastest algorithm. In a
situation where other solution methods take a huge amount time, ISG can provide a solution
in minimal amount of time. It provides either competitive or superior solution quality for
approximating distributional games, depending on type of uncertainty. For cases where
very large games need to be evaluated in short amount of time, ISG is unquestionably the
best choice.
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6.3

Experiments on Incorrect Game Model

This section describes experiments done to understand the effect of correctness of the game
model on solution quality. Defenders may assume a wrong standard deviation for the
attacker’s payoff function which will lead to a incorrect game model. The defender would
like to find solutions that are robust to this kind of incorrect assumptions. For this purpose,
the ISG algorithm was executed on the incorrect game model and calculations were done
later to find the final defender’s payoff based on the correct game model. The steps to
calculate defender’s payoff based on incorrect game model are shown in the following list.
1. Load correct DSG files
2. Modify the DSG files by changing the standard deviation.
3. Apply ISG algorithm on modified DSG files and get the solution (coverage vector).
4. Save the coverage vector that gives maximum payoff for the defender
5. Load correct DSG files
6. Calculate defender’s payoff using best coverage (from step 4) and correct DSG files
7. Take the average over the defender’s payoff
Figure 6.12 displays the experimental outcomes for executing ISG algorithm on the
incorrect game model. I put the incorrect standard deviation or uncertainty along the xaxis and the defender’s payoff along the y-axis. All five lines represent the characteristics for
each correct standard deviation. The experiments were done on 100 targets, 20 resources
and Gaussian distribution was used to define the attacker’s payoff. Figure 6.13 represents
the same experiments done on GMC solution method.
Figure 6.12 describes that if the game model is correct (where incorrect and correct standard deviation matches), we have the highest defender’s payoff for each of the standard
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Figure 6.12: Solution quality of ISG on incorrect game model

Figure 6.13: Solution quality of GMC on incorrect game model
deviations. However, if the defender assumes an incorrect standard deviation (underestimation or overestimation), he receives a lower payoff value. This same pattern is visible
from all five points on top of each of the incorrect standard deviations on the x-axis.

46

However, another important trait of ISG algorithm is visible from Figure 6.12. Whenever an overestimation is made (incorrect standard deviation is greater than the correct
one), the performance of ISG decreases less compared to the case when an underestimation
is made (incorrect standard deviation is lower than the correct one). In the circle on the left
there is a correct standard deviation of 0.2. But if we assume that standard deviation is 0.4,
which is an overestimation, the defender’s payoff falls down from 4.6 to 4.4. In the circle
to the right, the top square defines the correct standard deviation of 0.4. If the incorrect
standard deviation is 0.2, which is an underestimation, the defender’s payoff falls from 4.4
to 4.1. So making an underestimation creates more discrepancy in solution quality, where
overestimation leads to less erroneous results. I conducted the same set of experiments on
GMC with same parameters and found almost similar characteristics.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
Security has become one of the most significant issues for every nation in recent years
and applications of security games can play a great role in improving security decisions.
However, generating security game models is hindered by the issue of handling uncertainty
and errors in building the game models. Also, predicting characteristics of the attackers
and estimating their reward values are challenging for domain experts. The solutions for
allocating resources must allow for uncertainty while predicting behavior of an adversarial
entity, which is a strength of game theoretic modeling. If a proposed solution is not robust
in handling uncertainty and errors, it can not be applied to real-world scenarios. Existing
solution approaches use Bayesian games to model uncertainty, but those approaches are
very challenging from the model generation and computational point of view.
The introduced model handles this uncertainty based on intervals to represent payoffs
and takes a worst case approach to uncertainty. This approach is motivated in part by the
literature of robust optimization and robust game theory concept. I show that modeling
uncertainty using intervals has distinct computational advantages over Bayesian approach.
A highly efficient polynomial algorithm is presented for approximating solutions to interval
security games. This method has bounded errors and can quickly calculate solutions within
very small tolerances of the optimal solution. Empirical results for this algorithm show
much faster performance compared to an exact Mixed Integer Programming formulation.
I also showed how distributional uncertainty in an infinite Bayesian Stackelberg game
can be converted into interval uncertainty. A methodology was developed to transform
the distributional payoff to interval payoff and the fast algorithm, which was developed for
interval-based security games, was applied on that game model. To evaluate performance,
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the algorithm is tested on three types of distributions: Uniform, Gaussian with fixed standard deviation and Gaussian with variable standard deviation. For Uniform distribution,
the ISG method outperforms all other solution methods. In cases of Gaussian and Gaussian variable distributions, the solution quality is very competitive. Based on experimental
results, it is concluded that the interval approach is competitive in most cases and for
large games it is even better. The speed this novel approach is much faster than all other
existing solution methods, so it is concluded that this computationally efficient approach
is one of the best ways to solve large security games while still modeling uncertainty about
the payoffs.
The final set of experiments was conducted on incorrect game models to show that
both underestimation and overestimation of uncertainty on the attacker’s payoffs degrade
solution quality. However, underestimation of uncertainty will degrade the solution quality more than the case where the uncertainty is overestimated. One of the other major
advantages of this interval approach is the simplicity in the generation of game models.

7.1

Future Work

The time and solution quality advantages of the interval based approach may inspire researchers working in the field of security games for future works in adversarial domains.
The increased simplicity in generating the game model will allow domain experts to apply
this approach in field level applications with revolutionary ideas.
The foundation of this interval security game approach is a Stackelberg game, where
the defender (or leader) acts first and the attacker (follower) takes his actions based on
observation of defender’s strategies. However this assumption can fail if the attacker fails
to observe the defender’s strategies accurately. If traditional Stackelberg game approach is
used, the attacker will end up calculating incorrect payoffs and making a move based on that
calculation. In real-life scenarios the defenders may be undercover cops or closed circuit
cameras that are hard to observe. If the follower (attacker) observes it wrong, they will
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make wrong moves and convert the Stackelberg game model into a simultaneous-move game
model. Previously deployed security game applications did not handle this fundamental
uncertainty but there are some ongoing work on this issue [17]. So handling observational
uncertainty using intervals will be a notable extension of this work. The interval based
approach can also be used for more general classes of games (i.e., normal form games) with
simultaneous moves, and without the security game payoff structures.
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